Venezuela’s vast natural wealth has once again entered Washington’s strategic calculations. Beyond oil, the country’s potential mineral resources are being framed as assets of national importance, even as experts warn that turning ambition into reality would be far more complex than political rhetoric suggests.
When Donald Trump announced that U.S. companies would be allowed to tap into Venezuela’s vast oil reserves, the spotlight swiftly broadened far beyond petroleum, and policy discussions increasingly began to encompass minerals, metals, and even rare earth elements thought to lie beneath Venezuelan territory, resources considered vital across sectors such as defense, aerospace, clean energy, and consumer technology, and now central to U.S. national security deliberations.
Although drawing on Venezuela’s wider pool of resources might seem appealing in theory, experts warn it carries significant unpredictability. The extent, quality, and economic feasibility of much of this material remain uncertain, and the political, security, and environmental challenges tied to extraction are substantial. Consequently, most specialists concur that even a forceful effort from Washington would be unlikely to provide meaningful relief to America’s overburdened supply chains in the short or medium term.
Strategic interest beyond oil
For decades, Venezuela has been closely associated with oil, its vast proven crude reserves ranking among the world’s largest and influencing both its economic trajectory and its complex ties with the United States. Yet shifting geopolitical dynamics have broadened the notion of “strategic resources” well beyond hydrocarbons, as critical minerals and rare earth elements have become essential components for advanced manufacturing, renewable energy technologies and modern military equipment.
Officials within the administration have indicated they understand Venezuela’s worth could reach further than petroleum, and Reed Blakemore of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center notes that many now recognize the nation may possess a broader spectrum of natural resources. Yet he and others stress that recognizing such potential does not automatically translate into the capacity to harness it.
The difficulties linked to mining and exporting minerals in Venezuela are, in many ways, even more formidable than those confronting the oil industry, since oil extraction benefits from existing infrastructure and well-established global markets, whereas developing the mineral sector would demand broad geological assessments, substantial financial commitments and enduring stability — requirements that Venezuela does not currently meet.
Ambiguity lurking beneath the surface
One of the central problems facing any attempt to develop Venezuela’s mineral resources is the absence of reliable data. Years of political upheaval, economic crisis and international isolation have left large gaps in geological information. Unlike countries with transparent reporting and active exploration programs, Venezuela’s subsurface wealth is poorly mapped and often discussed in speculative terms.
The United States Geological Survey does not list Venezuela among countries with confirmed rare earth element reserves. This omission does not mean such resources are absent, but it underscores how little verified information exists. Experts believe Venezuela may host deposits of minerals such as coltan, a source of tantalum and niobium, as well as bauxite, which can yield aluminum and gallium. All of these metals are considered critical minerals by U.S. authorities.
Past Venezuelan leaders have made bold claims about these resources. In 2009, former president Hugo Chávez spoke publicly about large coltan discoveries, portraying them as a national treasure. Later, under Nicolás Maduro, the government established the Orinoco Mining Arc, a vast region designated for mineral exploration and extraction. In practice, however, the project became synonymous with environmental degradation, illegal mining and the presence of armed groups.
Security, governance and environmental risks
Mining is by nature a highly disruptive pursuit that depends on consistent governance, clear and enforceable rules, and assurances of long-term security. In Venezuela, such foundations are largely missing. Many areas thought to hold significant mineral reserves are isolated and poorly administered, leaving them exposed to unlawful activities.
Armed groups and criminal networks remain firmly embedded in illegal gold extraction in several regions of the country, as noted in numerous independent reports. With minimal oversight, these actors fuel violence, widespread deforestation and severe environmental contamination. Bringing in legitimate, large-scale mining operations under such conditions would be extremely challenging without sustained improvements in security and the enforcement of the rule of law.
Rare earth mining presents additional challenges. Extracting and processing these elements is energy-intensive and can generate hazardous waste if not properly managed. In countries with strict environmental standards, these risks translate into higher costs and longer project timelines. In Venezuela, where regulatory enforcement is weak, the environmental consequences could be severe, further complicating any attempt to attract responsible international investors.
As Blakemore has noted, even under optimistic assumptions, bringing Venezuelan minerals to global markets would be a “much more challenging story” than oil development. Without credible guarantees on safety, environmental protection and policy stability, few companies would be willing to commit the billions of dollars required for such projects.
China’s dominance in processing and refining
Even if U.S. firms were able to overcome the hurdles of extraction, another bottleneck looms: processing. Mining raw materials is only the first step in the supply chain. For rare earths in particular, refining and separation are the most technically complex and capital-intensive stages.
Here, China maintains a powerful lead. The International Energy Agency reported that, in 2024, China was responsible for over 90% of the world’s refined rare earth output. This overwhelming position stems from decades of government backing, assertive industrial strategies and relatively relaxed environmental oversight.
As Joel Dodge of the Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator has observed, China’s near-monopoly on processing confers both industrial and geopolitical leverage. Even if rare earths are mined elsewhere, they are often shipped to China for refining, reinforcing Beijing’s central role in the supply chain.
This situation adds complexity to Washington’s strategic planning, as gaining access to raw materials in Venezuela would hardly reduce reliance on China without concurrent investment in refining capacity at home or within allied nations, and such projects would take years to become operational while confronting their own regulatory and environmental obstacles.
Strategic importance of critical minerals for national security
The United States currently classifies 60 minerals as critical because of their vital role in economic and national security, a roster that covers metals like aluminum, cobalt, copper, lead and nickel, along with 15 rare earth elements including neodymium, dysprosium and samarium, all of which are woven into everyday technologies such as smartphones, batteries, wind turbines and electric vehicles, and remain indispensable for sophisticated weapons systems.
Despite their name, rare earth elements are not particularly scarce in the Earth’s crust. As geographer Julie Klinger has explained, the difficulty lies not in their abundance but in the complexity of extracting and refining them in an economically and environmentally sustainable way. This distinction is often lost in political discourse, leading to exaggerated expectations about the strategic value of unproven deposits.
U.S. lawmakers have grown increasingly troubled by the nation’s dependence on overseas suppliers for these materials, especially as tensions with China escalate, and efforts have emerged to bolster mining and processing within the country. Yet these domestic initiatives encounter extended timelines, local resistance and rigorous environmental assessments, so rapid outcomes remain improbable.
Venezuela’s constrained influence in the coming years
Against this backdrop, hopes that Venezuela might become a major source of critical minerals seem unattainable, as experts at BloombergNEF and various research organizations highlight a mix of obstacles that sharply limit the nation’s outlook: geological information that is outdated or missing, insufficient qualified workers, pervasive organized crime, long-standing underinvestment and a policy landscape marked by volatility.
Sung Choi of BloombergNEF has suggested that although Venezuela holds significant theoretical geological potential, the country is expected to remain a marginal player in global critical mineral markets for at least another decade, a view shaped not only by the technical hurdles of extraction but also by the wider institutional shortcomings that discourage sustained investment.
For the United States, this means that ambitions to diversify supply chains cannot rely on Venezuela as a quick fix. Even if diplomatic relations were to improve and sanctions eased, the structural barriers would remain formidable.
Geopolitical dynamics versus economic realities
The renewed emphasis on Venezuela’s resources underscores a familiar strain in global economic decision-making: the disconnect between geopolitical ambitions and what is economically achievable. Strategically, the prospect of tapping underexploited minerals in the Western Hemisphere carries strong appeal, supporting broader attempts to lessen reliance on competing powers while ensuring access to materials essential for tomorrow’s industries.
However, the development of natural resources is shaped by unavoidable practical constraints, as mining endeavors depend on dependable institutions, clear regulatory frameworks and long-term commitments from both governments and companies, while also relying on local community acceptance and credible, robust environmental protections.
In Venezuela’s case, these foundations have been steadily weakened by decades of political upheaval, and restoring them would call for long-term reforms that reach far beyond what any single trade or energy initiative could achieve.
A measured evaluation of expectations
Ultimately, experts urge caution in interpreting political statements about Venezuela’s resources. While the country’s underground wealth is often portrayed as vast and transformative, the evidence suggests a far more constrained outlook. Oil remains Venezuela’s most clearly defined asset, and even there, production faces significant obstacles.
Minerals and rare earth elements add another layer of complexity, with uncertain quantities, high extraction costs and global supply chains dominated by established players. For the United States, securing these materials will likely depend more on diversified sourcing, recycling, technological innovation and domestic capacity building than on opening new frontiers in politically unstable regions.
As the worldwide competition for critical minerals accelerates, Venezuela will keep appearing in strategic debates, yet its influence will probably stay limited without substantial on-the-ground reforms; aspiration by itself cannot replace the data, stability, and infrastructure that form the core of any effective resource strategy.
